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‘The Essence of the Union …’: Unionism, 
Nationalism and Identity On These Disconnected 
Islands 
 
 
Abstract 
 
Linda Colley (1996) identified three key ‘glues’ for the British Union 
state created in 1707: extensive wars with France; a uniting sense of 
Protestantism; and a burgeoning commercial and military empire. This 
article explores how two key parts of this project - namely, ‘unionism’ 
and a collective sense of ‘Britishness’ – has become increasingly 
disconnected in different parts of the United Kingdom. In particular, it 
examines the extent to which, following Colley’s historical argument, 
white and Protestant citizens remain more likely to identify with 
political Unionism and Britishness as compared to other ethnic and 
religious groups. The discussion includes an analysis of the degree to 
which ‘feeling British’ and ‘valuing the Union’ overlap, and whether a 
connected unionism can be discerned against trends which increasingly 
place emphasis on the sub-state nation as a key political community of 
attachment and identity. 
 
 
Key words: Britishness, Unionism, religion, ethnicity, national 
identity 
 
 
 
Introduction  
 
In her influential study of the forging of British national identity, Linda Colley 
(1996) identified three key ‘glues’ for the Union state created in 1707: 
extensive wars with (first Catholic, then Revolutionary, then Napoleonic) 
France; a uniting sense of Protestantism; and a burgeoning commercial and 
military empire. The British project, bringing together England, Wales, 
Scotland and - much more problematically – Ireland, was forged in war, 
sanctified by God, and rewarded through profit. In this article we explore how 
two key parts of this project - namely, ‘unionism’ and a collective sense of 
‘Britishness’ – has become increasingly disconnected in different parts of the 
United Kingdom. In particular, we will explore the extent to which, following 
Colley’s historical argument, white and Protestant citizens remain likely to 
identify with political Unionism and Britishness as compared to other ethnic 
and religious groups. The discussion includes an analysis of the degree to 
which ‘feeling British’ and ‘valuing the Union’ overlap, and whether a 
connected unionism can be discerned against trends which increasingly place 
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emphasis on the sub-state nation as a key political community of attachment 
and identity. 
 
 
Disconnected Unionisms 
 
Unionism across the United Kingdom has long comprised quite different 
histories and traditions. In explicit party political terms the ‘Unionist’ label 
came to prominence during the Irish Home Rule crisis of the 1880s. Under 
pressure from Irish Nationalists Gladstone committed to a Dublin legislature 
as part of a rather vague and evolving policy of ‘Home Rule All Around’. 
Gladstone’s puzzle was how to secure and strengthen the United Kingdom – 
lot least the Union between Britain and Ireland - whilst accommodating 
growing Irish self-assertion within it. ‘Home Rule’ aspired to a delicate 
balance between the ultimate sovereignty of the Imperial Parliament, and the 
interest of national partners within the UK. In event of doubt or conflict, 
Gladstone insisted, Westminster must prevail: 
 
… I define the essence of the Union to be this … A supreme statutory 
authority of the Imperial Parliament over Great Britain, Scotland, and 
Ireland as one United Kingdom ... The unity of the Empire must not be 
placed in jeopardy; the safety and welfare of the whole ... must be 
preferred to the security and advantage of the part. 
Gladstone (1886) 
  
Although Gladstone explicitly eschewed the term ‘federalism’ this was, 
arguably, his general direction of travel. But reforming visions of the union 
were swamped by hostility. Irish Home Rule tore the Victorian Liberals in two 
with a Whiggish ‘Committee for the Preservation of the Union’ joined by more 
radical figures led by Joseph Chamberlain. Adopting the name ‘Liberal-
Unionist’ the schismatics made common cause with the Conservatives. 
‘Unionism’ was thus sharply re-defined and mobilised as trenchant defence of 
the Constitutional status quo and, in particular, opposition towards the ‘Irish 
threat’. Alliance in Opposition was followed by formal Coalition in 
Government from 1895, and amidst the Ulster Crisis of 1912 the two parties 
formally merged. The intention had been to name the new entity ‘The 
Unionist Party’, but grassroots criticism led to the more cumbersome 
‘Conservative and Unionist Party’ (Lexden, 2012). 
 
This brief excursion into anti-Home Rule politics reveals the broad and 
changeable nature of ‘Unionism’ even in a Westminster Parliamentary 
context. Gladstone’s proposals were themselves cut from fundamentally 
unionist cloth, his paramount principle maintaining ‘the essence of the 
Union’. The reaction explicitly (and successfully) appropriated the term 
‘Unionist’ and thus, for a century and more, it defined ‘the Union’ as the 
Constitutional status quo and denoted trenchant resistance to any and all 
federalist or devolutionary (let alone separatist) proposals to alter that Union.  
 
Furthermore, post-Edwardian anti-Home Rule politics demonstrated a crucial 
and rapid territorial disconnection. In two constituent parts of the UK, the 
‘Unionist’ party label was preferred over ‘Conservative’ and thus stamped the 
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term explicitly and politically thereafter.  In Scotland the party was termed the 
‘Scottish Unionists’ with ‘Unionism’s distinctive symbolism and imagery … 
jealously guarded … to the extent that the term Conservative was expurgated 
from all official [Scottish] Unionist literature’ (Seawright, 1996:96).  The 
Unionist label was dropped in Scotland only in 1965. The other deviation was, 
and, is Northern Ireland where Unionism continues to define one side of a 
fierce territorial, political, religious and ethnic struggle over status and power. 
The adoption of the terms by Scottish Conservatives, and its ongoing Northern 
Irish associations has led to a complex identity for the ‘unionism’ in Scotland 
and Wales. For the Conservatives it was a badge of pride, for Nationalists it 
was an accusation to throw at Liberal and Labour. Only very recently has the 
term crept back into the political lexicon to (uncomfortably) encompass all 
those who oppose further autonomy/independence for Wales and Scotland.  
To cast this debate in a contemporary light, the media in Scotland routinely 
described ‘Better Together’, the cross party platform campaigning for a 
Scottish ‘No’ in the 2014 referendum, and their three key constituents – the 
Conservative, Labour and Liberal Democrat parties - as ‘unionist’ (see, e.g., 
Reid, 2013, Scotsman, 2013; Sunday Mail, 2013; BBC 2014). In light of the 
long campaign leading up to 2014 there was a broadening out of the term 
‘unionist’ to reflect a range of views, straddling the federalist heirs of 
Gladstone (Liberal Democrats), those proposing further devolved powers 
(Labour and at various times the Conservatives), and those proposing little 
change, or opposing any further change whatsoever (at other times the 
Conservatives). Notably, however, unionism remained an awkward term: and 
one all too rarely found in the formal rhetoric of Better Together, let alone 
Scottish Labour, or the Scottish Liberal Democrats. For example, neither the 
terms unionist nor unionism featured in these parties’ 2011 election 
manifestos, nor in the 64-page interim report of Scottish Labour’s Devolution 
Commission in 2013 (Scottish Labour, 2011, 2013; Scottish Liberal 
Democrats, 2011). Likewise the four keynote speeches at Scottish Labour’s 
2014 conference in Perth contained no references to unionist/unionism 
(Scottish Labour 2014).  
That having been said, neither did Labour explicitly eschew these terms until 
several months after the referendum. In January 2015 the new leader and 
deputy leader both explicitly distanced themselves from unionism. Jim 
Murphy insisted that he had "never been a unionist", noting that his ethno-
religious background precluded it: "As a family of Irish Catholic immigrants, 
we're not unionists. I grew up in a family of trade unionists, but we're not 
political unionists" (quoted in Clegg 2015). Several days later Kezia Dugdale 
echoed this rejection: “The first thing I would say is that I don't define myself 
as a unionist, it's not what shapes my politics” (quoted in Sunday Mail 2015) 
Given the term unionist has been politically and religiously coded in Scotland, 
and thus viewed with deep discomfort amongst many Labour activists, it is 
clearly a meaningful term in Scotland’s political landscape. By sharp contrast 
the term ‘Unionist’ more or less disappeared from England’s Conservative 
politics from the 1920s: the removal of the Irish Question from Westminster 
politics in 1921 also removed any urgency to proclaim a ‘Unionist’ position. As 
an illustration of this, the extensive online archive of the Margaret Thatcher 
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Foundation contains a searchable database of her speeches, press conferences 
and media interviews between 1945 and 2004. Whilst explicit references to 
unionists and unionism loom large, these are almost exclusively in the context 
of trades unions. The context and venues of Thatcher’s few explicit 
invocations of British Unionism are revealing - she declared her party as 
Unionist only in the contexts of Scotland and Northern Ireland, e.g.: 
 
… since the Act of Union, Scotland has had a proud history as a 
distinctive nation within the United Kingdom. We in this Party believe 
in a Scotland that continues to play a full part in the Kingdom and on 
equal terms. Now that every other Party in Scotland is challenging that 
role, it is vital that we defend it. Some people say that we're not a 
Scottish Party. But neither are we an English Party nor a Welsh Party 
nor an Irish Party. We are a Party of the whole United Kingdom. We 
are the Conservative and Unionist Party. And we will always be a 
Unionist Party. 
Thatcher (1988 – see also 1985a and 1985b) 
 
Conservative Unionism in the later twentieth century, therefore, operated at 
the UK’s national peripheries and had two key purposes: to placate and 
reassure Northern Ireland’s British-Protestant community and to rally local 
troops against Nationalist and devolutionary sentiment in Scotland and 
Wales. ‘The Union’ seems to have had little or no resonance at the centre (i.e. 
England) except in relation to these (more or less) pressing threats to the 
territorial integrity of the United Kingdom. The very meaning of ‘the’ Union 
and of ‘unionist’ cannot, therefore, be taken for granted. Like ‘Britishness’ 
these are historically malleable terms with quite different resonances (and 
perhaps little resonance at all) in different parts of the United Kingdom. The 
unionist glue, so to speak, has historically had its key functions at the edges of 
the British Union, in Scotland, in Wales and – par excellence – in Northern 
Ireland. It is less clear the extent to which, if at all, unionism matters in 
England. 
 
The remainder of this article, then, seeks to explore the assumption – implicit 
in Linda Colley’s analysis of the ‘glues’ that hold the UK together - that people 
supporting the Union and identifying most strongly with Britishness were 
historically likely to be white, Protestant citizens. To what extent, we ask, does 
this characterisation hold today? This is a pertinent question given the 
profound social and cultural transformations that have taken place in the UK 
over the last century. The UK is no longer the homogenously ‘white’ place it 
once was; through the decolonisation movements of the post-war period, and 
increasing immigration more recently, the UK is now a de facto multicultural 
country (even if recent UK governments have eschewed the policy of 
multiculturalism). Likewise, the decline of ‘Protestant Britain’, through the 
rise of religious pluralism and then a wave of thoroughgoing secularisation 
from the 1960s, have created a multi-faith, and perhaps post-Christian society 
(see, e.g., Brown 2009).  So how does concepts of Unionism and Britishness 
filter through the diverse society(ies) of the UK? Do white Protestants still 
invest the greatest attachments in Britishness and the Union (as Jim Murphy’s 
implied incommensurateness of unionism and Irish Catholic immigrant 
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heritage might imply), or have other ethnic and religious groups adopted these 
attachments as part of their integration? 
 
This article, therefore, focuses on a series of interlinked questions. Firstly does 
Britishness (still) matter, at personal and political levels, across the United 
Kingdom? As a litmus test of this, does Britishness possess a unifying, 
integrative purpose? That is, to what extent do different ethnic and religious 
groups – including white, minority ethnic, Catholic, Protestant, no religion 
and other faith - embrace a sense of Britishness and how does this compare to 
their views on or sub-state identities such as being Scottish or English? Does 
unionism – in its broad sense of defending the continuing territorial integrity 
of the United Kingdom – matter, and, if so to whom?  Finally we analyse the 
degree to which ‘feeling British’ and ‘valuing the Union’ overlap. 
 
 
On (Not) Feeling British 
 
Britishness, like any other identity, is not ‘fixed’ and ‘flat’ but malleable and 
historically and contextually specific. What it meant in 1915 is not what it 
means in 2015; and what it means in suburban London may not be at all what 
it means in rural Wales. Further, as Colley (1996:6) reminds us ‘Identities are 
not like hats. Human beings can and do put on several at a time’. We should 
not, then, think of national/territorial identities as a zero sum matter – rather, 
individuals mix, prioritise or nestle their identities with and within others. In 
terms of national/territorial identities it is no contradiction to feel, for 
example, British and Scottish and European and Jamaican, or to prioritise 
one or other of these in different situations. Furthermore, there has been 
considerable academic and governmental interest in Britishness and its (lack 
of) capacity to fully integrate and welcome a range of ethnic communities (see 
e.g. Parekh 2000; Modood 2007). Thirdly, the politics and rhetoric around 
‘race’, ethnicity and multiculturalism play out very differently in different 
parts of the United Kingdom (see, e.g., Hepburn 2014; Hepburn & Zapata-
Barrero 2014). Whilst Westminster politics has long featured a hostile agenda 
around immigration and race - and has recently witnessed a stampede 
towards the right in response to UKIP’s strident anti-EU and anti-
immigration rhetoric (Birrell, 2013) - the political situation at Holyrood is 
radically different. Here a demographic crisis of an ageing (and until recently 
shrinking) population, along with Scottish ‘myths’ around inclusion, have fed 
a cross-party consensus (if not a broader public view) that a welcoming 
attitude towards migrants is both an economic necessity and a Scottish 
‘tradition’ (see Hepburn, 2011; Hepburn & Rosie, 2014). 
 
To what extent, if at all, do these different nuances around unionism and 
around race/inclusion mirror the extent to which people describe themselves 
as British across the component parts of the United Kingdom? To unpick 
these questions we examine data from major datasets between 2009 and 2011, 
i.e. the period immediately prior to the long campaign around Scotland’s 2014 
independence referendum. To begin the analysis we report responses to an 
‘open’ question on British identity whereby the respondent is shown a card 
naming a number of possible identities (British, Irish, European, etc) and 
prompted to choose as many (or few) as they feel are personally relevant and 
5 
 
to volunteer other identities that may not be on the card. The wording of the 
question in the 2011 British Social Attitudes survey was: 
 
Please say which, if any, of the words on this card describes the way 
you think of yourself. Please choose as many or as few as apply. 
 
Table 1 reports the findings in the three component nations of Britain in 
2009-11 (Northern Ireland is discussed below). Here we have merged the 
British Social Attitudes surveys from 2009, 2010 and 2011 and done the same 
with the Scottish Social Attitudes surveys from the same years. Merging these 
datasets allows greater purchase on small sub-samples, particularly amongst 
ethnic and religious minorities: 
 
Table 1 
‘Open’ national identities across Britain, 2009-11 
 
Thinks self as … 
 
ENGLAND SCOTLAND WALES 
    
British 68 49 61 
English 57 5 13 
European 12 9 4 
Irish 2 3 2 
Northern Irish * 1 * 
Scottish 2 83 1 
Ulster * * * 
Welsh 2 1 63 
Asian 2 1 1 
African/Caribbean 1 * 1 
Other answer 4 4 2 
None of these 1 1 1 
    
Unweighted base  8,751 4,174 557 
 
Sources:  
England, Wales = merged BSA datasets 2009-2011;  
Scotland = merged SSA datasets 2009-2011 
 
 
There are four key points to take from Table 1 and which underpin our 
subsequent analysis and argument. First, simple arithmetic supports Colley’s 
point about ‘hats’: many people in each territory chose more than one identity. 
Key amongst these are those who chose both their ‘state’ identity (i.e. being 
British), and the ‘sub-state’ identity of their territory (i.e. being English, 
Scottish, or Welsh). There are some differences in this across territory - in 
England 34% chose a combination of English/British; in Wales 31% were 
Welsh/British; and in Scotland 39% were Scottish/British. We should not 
assume that these dualities are directly comparable. There are a number of 
claims, for example, that whilst Scottish and Welsh people draw a relatively 
clear distinction between Britishness and their sub-state identities, in England 
any distinction is fuzzy (Bond & Rosie, 2010; Langlands, 1999; Kumar, 2003). 
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It should also be noted that different measures of identity can produce much 
higher reservoirs of such dual identities (see, for example, Bond & Rosie, 
2002, 2010). 
 
The second point relates to Britishness, which represented a majority in both 
England (68%) and Wales (61%), but just half of respondents in Scotland 
(49%). We should be wary in assuming that Britishness means the same thing 
in each place and that there is just ‘less of it’ in Scotland. As noted, the term 
‘British’ (as with any other identity) must be treated with critical caution: its 
meaning and nuance may, in fact, be quite varied (this is particularly clear in 
Northern Ireland, as explored below). This leads us to the third point which 
concerns ‘sub-state’ identities. In England slightly more people chose being 
British than chose being English: in Wales the two identities were broadly 
equally chosen; whilst in Scotland considerably more people chose to describe 
themselves as Scottish. The position of Britishness relevant to the ‘local’ 
national identity thus differs markedly across Britain Finally no other 
proffered territorial identity has widespread popularity (though about one-in-
seven respondents in Wales felt English). 
 
Northern Ireland is missing from table 1 because the ‘open’ question on 
identity has not been asked there for a decade (the last major vehicle to ask an 
‘open’ identity question was the Northern Ireland Life and Times Survey 
2003). The open question is less relevant in Northern Ireland since few would 
argue that the relevant sub-state identity in Northern Ireland - Northern 
Irishness - is national in character (see Gallagher, 1995). Indeed a sharp 
cleavage between state identity (actual or desired) is at the very heart of 
Northern Ireland’s Troubles “and for most people national identity boils down 
to a mutually exclusive choice between British or Irish” (Bond & Rosie, 2010: 
86. See also Coakley, 2007). In 2003, for example, just 3% of people in 
Northern Ireland reported feeling both British and Irish; likewise just 4% felt 
both Irish and Northern Irish, and just 13% as both British and Northern 
Irish. Given the much lower incidence of overlap between identities, Northern 
Irish surveys tend to ask only for which identity ‘best’ describes the 
respondent. This is directly comparable to a follow up question in the British 
and Scottish surveys which asks respondents who have chosen two or more 
identities to indicate which of these ‘best describes the way you think of 
yourself’. 
 
Table 2, then, shows responses to that question of ‘best’ identity. In England 
we again find that Britishness ‘outweighed’ Englishness, though not by a very 
great deal; whilst in Wales we saw rather greater weight given to Welshness 
(with just over half choosing this as their ‘best’ identity). In Scotland, quite 
notably, a very large majority (75%) selected Scottishness as their best 
identity, compared to just 16% who chose Britishness. Clearly - and as other 
studies have shown - the primary national identity at play North of the Tweed 
is Scottishness (see, e.g. McCrone, 1997; Kiely et al, 2005; Bond & Rosie, 
2010). In Northern Ireland we see a different pattern again with three 
identities having prominence – British, Irish, and Northern Irish. To a large 
extent – as we shall see - the first two of these are religiously, ethnically and 
politically coded ‘opposites’, whilst Northern Irishness identity may serve, to 
some extent, as an ‘escape route’ from these: 
7 
 
Table 2  
‘Best’ choice identities, 2009-11 
 
 ENGLAND SCOTLAND WALES NORTHERN 
IRELAND 
     
British 47 16 35 36 
English 40 2 8  
European 3 2 1  
Irish 1 1 1 29 
Northern Irish * * - 28 
Scottish 1 75 1  
Ulster - * * 3 
Welsh 1 * 53  
Other answer 5 4 1 5 
None of these 1 * *  
     
Unweighted base  8,751 4,174 557 2,433 
 
Sources:  
England, Wales = merged BSA datasets 2009-2011;  
Scotland = merged SSA datasets 2009-2011 
N. Ireland = merged NILT datasets 2009-10. 
Note – NILT did not offer certain identities to their respondents – in the table above these 
identities are denoted by blank cells 
 
 
Britishness: Ethnic Underpinnings? 
 
It is clear that national identities, and in particular Britishness, are not 
common to these islands but, rather, vary very significantly across them. To 
what extent, though, is Britishness underpinned by ethnic/religious factors 
and are such factors similar across the UK? In short, does Britishness still 
operate as a unifying ‘glue’ across the UK and, if so, does it do so in the same 
way in different places? Such analysis is constrained by the limitations of the 
available survey materials and their samples. BSA and NILT, for example, do 
not routinely ask respondents where they born; and the sample sizes for 
religious and ethnic minorities in these surveys and in SSA tend to be small. 
Because of these limitations careful explanation of what the data can and 
cannot tell us is essential. We begin with a short summary for each territory: 
in Northern Ireland we will necessarily be concerned with ‘best identity’: 
elsewhere we will focus on the more ‘open’ question on national identity. 
 
Britishness in Northern Ireland 
 
Northern Ireland is a useful place to begin since it contains a popular form of 
Britishness that most people in the rest of the United Kingdom do not 
understand, let alone share. Yet the ‘defensive’ link between Britishness and 
Protestantism found in Northern Ireland springs from the very same historic 
Britishness, forged as it was – pace Colley – in wars against Catholic France 
and in the pursuit of a great imperial project. Thomas Jones Barker’s The 
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Secret of England’s Greatness (c.1863) encapsulates the intermixture of 
Crown, Empire and Protestantism in its portrayal of Victoria gifting a Bible to 
a servile African Prince (National Portrait Gallery, n.d.). Whilst many might 
see such a portrait as symbolic of a Britain long past, in Northern Ireland it 
continues to figure on Orange Banners and can be seen as a very potent and 
contemporary claim both to ‘Ulster’s’ place within the family of British 
nations, and its key role as the defender of Union. England may have 
forgotten, or discarded, the Secret of its (former) Greatness: Protestant Ulster 
has not.  
 
Notably, very few – just 6% - of Northern Ireland’s Catholics describe ‘British’ 
as their best identity, as compared to 61% of Northern Ireland’s Protestants. 
Britishness is higher amongst those Protestants who support one of the two 
major Unionist parties (amongst both Ulster Unionists and Democratic 
Unionists 65% chose being British): Alliance-supporting Protestants are as 
likely to describe their key identity as Northern Irish (41%) as they are to 
describe it as British (43%). We also find a strong association between 
national identity and the Constitution, with the overwhelming majority (91%) 
of British identifiers wishing to remain within the United Kingdom. If 
Protestant-Unionism is a key underpinning of Northern Ireland’s Britishness, 
are there other ethnic factors beyond the historic ‘sectarian’ divide? Here we 
are limited by the data: NILT in 2009 and 2010 did not ask respondents 
where they were born, and whilst there are questions on ethnicity/race and on 
religion, the released data is in fact quite restrictive. The only released data on 
ethnicity is whether or not the respondent considers themselves ‘to be a 
member of a minority ethnic community’ – accounting for 5% of the survey - 
but we cannot dig much deeper to see what kinds of groups and nationalities 
are involved. 
 
We constructed binary logistic regression models to identify key predictors of 
choosing a ‘best identity’, respectively, as British and as Irish. The 
independent variables explored were gender, age (in years), religion, and 
whether or not the respondent described themselves as belonging to an ethnic 
minority. We found very striking religious and ethnic effects. Taking the 
religious first, Protestants were more than twice as likely to claim a British 
‘best identity’ as the non-religious, whilst Catholics were just one one-ninth as 
likely. In other words Protestants are – with age, sex and ethnicity held 
constant – around twenty five times more likely than Catholics to claim 
Britishness as their preferred identity. As we will see when we consider the 
other territories this is a remarkable and perhaps unparalleled level of 
difference.  
 
It is perhaps unsurprising, therefore, that respondents describing themselves 
as ‘minority ethnic’ in Northern Ireland were very unlikely to describe 
themselves as British. Members of such groups, perhaps, regard themselves as 
outside, and unwilling to be aligned within, a fierce conflict over territory and 
identity. This view was supported by our model on Irishness which indicated 
that Catholics were around fifty times more likely (other variables being held 
constant) than Protestants to choose being Irish as their ‘best identity’. Here 
too we found that minority ethnic respondents highly unlikely to choose an 
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Irish identity: both ‘Irish’ and ‘British’ are heavily coded in Northern Ireland, 
and do not offer a comfortable identity for minorities. 
 
Britishness in England 
 
In sharp contrast to Northern Ireland we have much better data coverage for 
England. There is also a very different pattern of identity: on the ‘open’ 
question choosing Britishness was embraced by a majority in almost all 
ethnic/religious sub-groups, and even in groups where it was not (amongst 
respondents born outwith the UK and amongst the ‘Asian: Other’ and ‘Other’ 
ethnic groups), it was chosen by around half. That is, Britishness in England 
seems to be a relatively open, broadly ‘civic’ identity, with no clear and 
exclusive ethnic basis (see Cohen, 1994). We see a very different pattern for 
Englishness. Being born in England was a key factor, and there was a clear 
correlation with visible ethnicity: in every group except ‘White’ only a minority 
(and sometimes rather small minorities) described themselves as English. In 
only two religious groups (albeit the largest ones: Church of England 
identifiers and those of No religion) did we find an English majority. Both of 
these groups were both disproportionately born in England and 
disproportionately ‘White’: 
 
These findings map onto previous research. A Commission for Racial Equality 
(CRE) study in 2006 found a: 
 
... sharp difference in the ways in which white English and ethnic 
minority participants [in England] thought of themselves. Most white 
English participants saw themselves as English, first and foremost, but 
also as British. By contrast, most ethnic minority participants ... saw 
themselves as British, to the exclusion of any identification with 
England, since they strongly associated England with white English 
people.  
CRE, 2006: 37 
 
Using logistic regression on the 2011 BSA dataset (the only one in our series to 
record the respondent’s country of birth) we found a complex picture of the 
ethnic/cultural bases of British identity in England. We found no statistically 
significant difference between Whites and South Asians, although Black 
Britons are more likely to describe themselves as British, and Other Asians 
less likely. Likewise, whilst all the various Christian denominations (including 
Catholics) and Hindus are no more or less likely than the irreligious to 
describe themselves as British, Muslims and Other Non-Christians are more 
likely.  
 
Britishness in England, then, is an open and ‘civic’ identity, but it was one 
more open to – or at least more frequently chosen by – certain minorities. To 
an extent this pattern may be explained by the extent to which the other main 
identity found in England – Englishness – is ethnically coded. Logistic 
regression on whether respondents feel English found that being of minority 
religion and minority ethnicity were very important negative predictors: in 
particular, Asians, Blacks, and Muslims were highly unlikely to select an 
English identity. Given this, for at least some within these groups Britishness 
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may be the only ‘UK’ identity they feel appropriate or open to them. 
Britishness, therefore, operates as a ‘civic canopy’ which can accommodate 
those who feel comfortable with Englishness, but also those who do not. 
 
 
Being British in Wales 
 
Unpicking relationships in Wales is difficult because of the limitations of 
recent surveys. Nevertheless, as table 3 shows, we can discern some broad 
trends. Birthplace is crucial, with clear differences between those born in 
Wales and those born in England. For those born in Wales, being British was 
less frequently chosen than being Welsh (82% as compared to 56%); for those 
born in England far more (80%) choose being British than choose being 
Welsh (16%). Notably (though not shown in the table) half (48%) of the 
England-born in Wales also describe themselves as English. Whilst an English 
identity is highly salient for this group, it is Britishness that emerges as the 
key identity. 
 
We are sorely limited in taking this analysis further, however, since we only 
know the birthplaces of respondents in the 2011 survey. The lack of minority 
ethnic and minority faith respondents in the surveys makes it impossible to 
draw any conclusions for Wales, though the CRE (2006: 35) found that 
participants in Wales, including BME respondents, were more likely to 
describe themselves as Welsh rather than British. We do have sufficient data 
to suggest that intra-Christian differences are modest. Catholics seem 
(although the sample size is small) to be less likely to choose being Welsh, 
though this may well be largely explained through birthplace. ‘Other 
Christians’ –incorporating those Protestant groups which were historically 
strong in Wales – are no more or less likely to choose being Welsh, but do 
appear to be less likely to describe themselves as British: 
 
Table 3 
National identities in Wales 
 
WALES  British Welsh 
   
All 61 63 
   
Born in Wales * 56 82 
Born in England * 80 16 
   
No religion 63 64 
Catholic ** 64 41 
Church of Wales/Anglican 62 65 
Other Christian  47 64 
   
Unweighted base  557 557 
 
Source: BSA merged 2009-2011 datasets.  
(* birth data based on 2011 only, unweighted base = 174) 
 (** unweighted base of Catholic sub-sample < 50) 
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Scotland and Britishness 
 
Finally, in Scotland we found (as have previous studies – e.g. McCrone et al 
1998; Kiely et al 2001; Rosie 2012) that a very substantial proportion of the 
differences found in claiming Scottishness disappear when we control for 
place of birth. Overall, 83% of respondents in Scotland described themselves 
as Scottish and 49% as British. Amongst respondents born in Scotland, 
however, Scottishness rose to 94%, whilst Britishness remained at 49%. Three 
points are important here: Scottishness is very widespread in Scotland and 
claimed by almost everyone born in Scotland; Britishness, however, is also 
claimed by substantial numbers (including around half of the Scotland-born); 
and many respondents claim to be both Scottish and British. The position of 
minorities is interesting: although some sample sizes are small – these are 
indicated in the table through asterisks - there is no apparent pattern across 
religion or ethnicity when we control for birth-place. We find that choosing 
Scottish identity is ubiquitous amongst the Scotland-born in all groups. If 
Britishness plays a ‘civic canopy’ role in England, it appears to be Scottishness 
that fulfils this function in Scotland. Again this chimes with the small-scale 
CRE study, which found that “In Scotland and Wales – and this was true 
among both white and ethnic minority participants – there was a much 
stronger identification with each country than with Britain” (2006:35): 
 
Table 4: 
Identities in Scotland amongst respondents born in Scotland 
 
 British Scottish 
   
All 49 94 
   
No religion 46 94 
Christian (no denomination) 59 89 
Catholic 45 95 
Church of Scotland 54 94 
Episcopalian * 57 93 
Other Christian 54 90 
Muslim ** 27 100 
Other Non-Christian * 52 96 
   
   
White: All origins 49 94 
South Asian origins * 46 100 
Others * 50 92 
 
Source: SSA merged 2009-2011 datasets.  
(* unweighted base of sub-sample < 50) 
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What, though, of Britishness? Here there was more variation, although most 
subgroups hovered around the 50% mark. One intriguing exception to this is 
Scotland’s native-born Muslims who did not embrace Britishness to any great 
extent (note, however the small sample size). To some extent this might 
represent a particular identity shift relating to UK wars in Iraq and 
Afghanistan, and Scottishness being seen as more ‘welcoming’ and 
accommodating than Britishness within the Scottish context (see Hussain & 
Miller, 2006, on Scottish Pakistanis and Saaed et al (1999) and Hopkins 
(2004, 2007) on Scottish Muslims). Certainly Muslims in Scotland and in 
England seem markedly different in their positioning to British and sub-state 
identities.  
 
Finally, what of those born in England? Here we find patterns broadly 
comparable to those found in Wales. On the ‘open’ question a relatively high 
proportion of England-born respondents chose being British (68%) with a 
sizeable minority choosing being English (38%). In both Scotland and Wales, 
then, being born in England is associated with higher levels of British identity 
than amongst the ‘native born’. There are, though, no hard and impermeable 
lines of difference here: notably, almost as many Scottish residents born in 
England describe themselves as being Scottish (35%) as choose being English 
(38%). 
 
 
British Together: Defending the Union? 
 
The survey evidence from 2009-11 makes it abundantly clear that Britishness 
is not ‘common’ across the constituent parts of the United Kingdom but varies 
across them. Neither is there much evidence that the 18th and 19th Century 
(White) Protestant Britishness that formed Colley’s historic glue of the United 
Kingdom holds any 21st Century social purchase except in Northern Ireland. 
In England Britishness operates as a ‘civic canopy’, and attracts certain 
minorities (most notably Muslims), perhaps since Englishness seems to be 
strongly coded as ‘white’. In Wales and Scotland Britishness is associated with 
place of birth, with the England-born in particular embracing it as their 
primary identity - and in Scotland Scottishness operates as the ‘civic canopy’. 
What, though, of Britishness as a political identity related to maintaining the 
cohesion of the United Kingdom? Whilst we will show that this is quite clearly 
the (cohesive and divisive) role of Britishness in Northern Ireland, does it 
possess strong ‘constitutional’ meanings elsewhere?  
 
In Northern Ireland there is a clear association between Britishness and 
support for continued union with the rest of the United Kingdom. The 
overwhelming majority of those for whom British was the ‘best’ identity – 91% 
- took such a position, compared to just 40% of those who chose Irish. Those 
who claim ‘Other’ identities as paramount are most likely to ‘opt out’ of the 
constitutional debate, with a third (32%) answering ‘other’ or ‘don’t know’. 
Notably a similar proportion of those describing themselves as members of an 
ethnic minority take the same position.  
 
If British unionism is alive and well in Northern Ireland, it still has discernible 
effects in Scotland, at least in a loose and ‘descriptive’ form. Most people in 
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the Scottish surveys 2009-11 – 67% - wanted to remain in the United Kingdom 
(and might thus be termed, if cautiously, as ‘unionist’). This held true across 
national identity, and included 62% of those who describe their ‘best identity’ 
as Scottish. It should be noted, of course, that there is no easy conflation 
between national identity and more specific constitutional preference in 
Scotland (on the ‘non-alignment’ found here see Bond 2000, 2009).  
Strikingly, though, support for the Union was much stronger amongst British 
identifiers (82%), and particularly dominant amongst those who declare 
British to be their best identity (91%). Scotland’s unionism was, however, in 
tune with the spirit of Gladstone: the most popular constitutional choice 
regardless of identity was that of a powerful Holyrood within the United 
Kingdom. 
 
Interestingly, opinions on Scotland’s future were remarkably similar in 
England (table 5) although respondents in England were more likely to favour 
Scotland being part of the United Kingdom without a devolved parliament. 
(Note that only a sub-sample of England’s respondents in BSA 2011 were 
asked this question):  
 
Table 5: 
Views on Scotland’s future 
 
 Scotland England 
   
Remain part of the United Kingdom without a 
Scottish Parliament 
8 19 
Remain part of the United Kingdom, with a 
Scottish Parliament without tax powers 
8 12 
Remain part of the United Kingdom, Scottish 
Parliament with some tax powers 
50 33 
All ‘unionist’ 67 63 
   
Independent, within EU 17 15 
Independent, Outside EU 10 11 
All ‘independence’ 27 26 
   
Other/DK 6 11 
   
Unweighted base 4,164 967 
 
Sources: 
Scotland - merged SSA datasets 2009-2011 
England - BSA 2011 
 
 
To what extent did ethnicity and religion play a role in attitudes towards 
Scotland’s future? Here we constructed logistic regression models for those 
taking unionist positions (broadly defined as those wishing Scotland to remain 
part of the UK) in both Scotland and England. From our earlier analysis we 
know that ethnicity and religion had a complex and territorially varying 
relationship with Britishness; here we explored whether, and to what extent, 
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religion/ethnicity and national identification were significant in explaining 
‘unionist’ sentiment in Scotland and England. 
 
For Scotland we found that the key predictor of a broadly unionist position 
was national identity. British identifiers (on the ‘open’ question) were three 
times more likely (other things being equal) to be unionist than those who did 
not describe themselves as British. Further, Scottish identifiers were less likely 
to be unionist than those who did not identify as Scottish. Race/ethnicity 
played no significant role, with only limited effects for religion (most notably 
here, for our purposes, that the ‘Other Religion’ group were less likely, all 
other factors held constant, to take a unionist position).  Race/ethnicity and 
religion did not feature at all in our model for England’s views on Scotland. 
Here, as in Scotland, there were class and age effects (older people are more 
likely to be unionist, working class people less likely) and more modest 
national identity effects. In England an English identification was not 
significant, but those who felt British were half as likely again to be unionist as 
those who did not. 
 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
Surveys in the period immediately prior to the long campaign around 
Scotland’s independence referendum illuminates how both Britishness and 
‘unionism’ varied across the different territories of the United Kingdom. It 
revealed the very different ethnic and religious ‘coding’ (or not) of Britishness 
across territory, and the broad irrelevance of ethnic and religious division 
outside Northern Ireland with regard to unionism. In England Britishness 
proves to be a ‘civic canopy’, an identity claimed across all sorts of ethnic 
groups. Notably, such a role in Scotland is played by Scottishness. 
 
These differences beg the question of what ‘the Union’ might mean for 
different Britons in different places. Certainly the Union remains the defining 
question in Northern Irish politics, and is a key question in Scotland (and, 
increasingly, Wales). But there is evidence that those who believe in the 
unionist integrity of the United Kingdom – measured in terms of Northern 
Ireland and Scotland remaining part of the UK – are overwhelmingly 
supportive of devolution in these islands (or at least for its so-called 
peripheries). Almost 130 years on Gladstone’s rather fuzzy vision of Home 
Rule All Around has been largely embraced. And this fuzzy constitutional 
settlement does not seem to unduly concern (or, perhaps, interest) the UK’s 
ethnic minorities.  
 
In Scotland such minorities feel Scottish and are just as likely to support (or 
oppose) further constitutional change as their fellow Scots. In Northern 
Ireland minorities locate themselves between (or perhaps outwith) the religio-
national divide. In England, despite very high levels of Britishness amongst 
some minorities, these exhibit little particular anxiety on Scotland’s place 
within the UK. This may be suggestive that England’s minorities to some 
extent conflate England and Britain (as do their ethnic majority neighbours – 
see Langlands, 1999): a post-union Britishness may seem contradictory, or 
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even endangered, in Scotland and Northern Ireland (and, in all probability, 
Wales) but may make sense in England because of the lack of a clear 
distinction there between ‘state’ and ‘sub-state’ identities.  
 
What future, then, is there for unionism and for Britishness? Overall, the 
latter seems in better health, taking the UK as a whole, than the former. 
Unionism has splintered into different ‘peripheral’ visions and has largely 
withered in the centre. That respondents in England show a remarkably 
similar pattern of opinion on Scotland’s future to respondents in Scotland 
suggests one of two things: that they are ‘sold’ on the benefits to the UK of 
devolution to the other nations, or that they are quite relaxed about Scotland 
making its own decisions on most matters. Unionism, then, seems to have 
become flexible and territorially specific, even to the point of its own 
disappearance. Britishness, on the other hand, remains a widespread identity 
even if what we mean by ‘British’ may differ, and indeed may differ quite 
substantially, across these islands.  That diversity may be a strength far more 
than it is a weakness, and allow a flexible Britishness to survive further 
constitutional change. Finally, Britishness in England continues to operate as 
a unifying and civic identity under which ethnic minorities can be 
accommodated – and shows little sign of being troubled by any prospective 
‘break up of Britain’. 
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